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Does mobile phone usage boost productivity in developing countries? 
 
Abstract 
The aim of this study is to assess the impact of mobile phone proliferation on productivity, using 
data from 73 low-income countries, from the period 2000-2016. The sample includes countries 
from Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America and Caribbean. The author's findings show that holding 
all else constant, a 1 percent increase in mobile penetration rate boosts output per capita by 2.6 
percent. These findings confirm there are increasing returns (network effects) to productivity 
associated with an increase in penetration rate. Results also show that the ease of doing business 
matters in low-income countries in that it influences the speed at which higher productivity is 
achieved.  
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1. Introduction 
This paper assesses the relationship between mobile phone penetration and economic 
development in low-income countries, particularly Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America and 
Caribbean (all excluding high-income countries). The central question to this study is: does mobile 
phone proliferation have an impact on productivity in developing countries? 
Developing countries typically lag in technology adoption and yet both popular news 
sources and academic literature support the hypothesis that technology has some substantial 
benefits to the broader economy. This paper focusses on information and communication 
technology, especially mobile phones. Information and communication technologies, including 
mobile phones raise productivity among economic agents in developing countries (Wamboye et. 
al., 2016a, 2015b). Equally important is that mobile phone proliferation provides access to micro 
financial services to underserved communities, who are then economically empowered when they 
use cell phones to get access to basic financial services (Suri and Jack, 2016). In this light, mobile 
phones can add to broader financial inclusion and lift people out of poverty as well as raise 
incomes. Other than financial inclusion, mobile phone technology can have an impact on the 
economy by boosting agricultural outcomes in developing countries (Zanello, 2012; Jensen 2007). 
Mobile phones can be used to access essential market information such as prices and improve 
efficiency. This boots agricultural outcomes, which then add to aggregate output in the economy.  
Information and communication technologies also have the capacity to empower women at the 
micro level (Suri and Jack, 2016; Addai, 2017). Women can become more get more autonomy in 
the household by using mobile phones, which make them more economically productive. On top 
of that, information and communication technology development is inherently capital intensive, 
meaning that mobile phone proliferation can boost physical capital accumulation in developing 
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countries (Andrianaivo and Kpodar, 2012). Development of mobile technology infrastructure 
require large investments in information technology hardware, which can be diffused and used to 
raise productivity in other sectors as well. Perhaps most important of all, with respect to low-
income countries, is that mobile phone proliferation has "dramatic" effects on the real economy. 
These dramatic effects can be explained by the concept of increasing returns to scale or network 
effects (Aker and Mbiti, 2010; Gruber and Pantelis, 2011; Wamboye et. al., 2016a, 2015b). For 
instance, in rural Africa, mobile phones reduce information search costs, risk; encourage 
generation of employment; and improve coordination among firms. However, there are also some 
opportunity costs involved with mobile phone proliferation in low-income countries Heeks (1999). 
These are discussed in detail in the literature review section of this paper. 
The purpose of this paper is to assess the impact of mobile phone proliferation on 
productivity in low-income countries. I answer the question of whether mobile phones do increase 
productivity in developing countries using OLS panel regression analysis. I assess the impact of 
mobile phone technology on productivity (output per capita) in a sample of 73 Sub-Saharan 
African, Latin American and Carribean countries over the period 2000–2016. Doing this adds to 
the existing body of literature that supports the idea of adopting the relatively cheaper and more 
accessible mobile phone technology while also critiquing previous studies on the topic. As already 
stated, technology adoption boosts economic outcomes in low-income countries. But this low-
income status may mean countries may not able to adopt high value-added technologies typically 
found in industrialized or developed countries. As such, this paper provides basis for encouraging 
more adoption of the cheaper and more accessible mobile phone technologies, which provide also 
raise productivity. This implies that low-income countries can leapfrog the relatively costlier 
technologies of the industrialized world.  
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The contributions of this work are that while I largely replicate Wamboye et. al. (2016a, 
2015b) panel regression model for the control indicators, I also add another control variable to 
indicate the ease of conducting business in low-income countries. This is important in that without 
a conducive business environment, mobile phone technology adoption may be futile in low-income 
countries. For instance, if one gets access to market information via a mobile phone device, it may 
not help if there are regulatory constraints that hinder use of this information. Unlike Wamboye 
et. al. (2016a, 2015b); who combine and use the sum of several information and communication 
technologies indicators as the main independent variable, I treat my independent variables 
separately. I then also add quadratic terms to these variables to reflect increasing returns or network 
effects. Wamboye et. al. (2016a, 2015b) measure productivity as real output per worker growth 
whereas I assess the impact of mobile phone proliferation on real output per person. The work of 
Wamboye et. al. (2016) has been identified as the basis for building the preliminary regression 
model for this project. Wamboye et. al. (2016) study is based on data from 43 Sub-Saharan African 
countries. The authors find that doubling the penetration rate of fixed and mobile-cellular 
telephones boost labor productivity growth by about 0. 12–0.15 per cent, and 0.05 per cent, 
respectively. The results prove financial inclusion as one of the possible channels through which 
mobile phone proliferation enhances labor productivity growth in sub-Saharan Africa (Wamboye 
et. al., 2016). From these findings, questions arise pertaining to what rates of proliferation are 
necessary for significant additions to economic growth for the countries in question. Also 
following up on these findings, there needs to be more clarity with respect to other channels 
through which mobile phones spur economic growth. These issues are discussed further in the 
subsections below.    
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My results are robust and consistent with previous studies. I find that an increase in mobile 
phone penetration in low income countries by 1 percent adds to per capita output by 2.6 percent, 
proving that networks effects are indeed present. Also, my contribution to existing literature also 
seems robust and valid based on these results. The ease of doing business matters in that I find an 
inverse relationship between number of days required to legally start operating a business and 
output per person.  
The rest of this paper is structured into the following sections: Section 2 and its subsections 
review literature and emphasize the various channels in which mobile phone proliferations adds to 
productivity in low-income countries. Section 3 and 4 discuss capital accumulation potential as 
well as opportunity costs associated with mobile phone proliferation in developing countries 
respectively. Section 5 discusses the data, choice of variables and the econometric model. Section 
6 discusses the results of this study. Section 7 concludes with potential implications of these 
findings and a discussion on future research opportunities. 
 
2. Literature Review 
Channels for Economic Impact 
2.1 Financial Inclusion  
Perhaps the most acknowledged channel for realizing the benefits of mobile phone usage 
in developing countries is financial inclusion. Financial inclusion is defined by the World Bank as 
access to useful and affordable financial products that satisfy daily needs such as processing 
payments, transactions, savings, credit, insurances, and so on. These must of course be delivered 
in a secure and sustainable way. The World Bank reports that around two billion people worldwide 
do not use formal financial services and more than half of adults in the poorest households are 
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unbanked (World Bank, 2018). And yet, financial inclusion has the potential to significantly 
reduce poverty and improve prosperity. For this reason, the Bank would like to see universal 
financial access (UFA) by 2020. Mobile phones, with their capacity to house mobile financial 
service applications, are one affordable way of bringing into the financial market households that 
were previously financially excluded. 
One article from The Economist mentions discusses how mobile phones spur innovation 
and boost incomes (Economist, 2016). Farmers can use them to obtain essential market 
information such as prices before selling to the middlemen. Mobile phones also reduce transaction 
costs in that they can facility payments in mobile money, which is more secure and reliable that 
traditional systems. For instance, after gaining access to M-Pesa, ("M" for mobile and "Pesa" for 
money) Kenya’s mobile-money service, approximately 2 percent of Kenyan households were 
lifted out of poverty between 2008 and 2014. M-Pesa has been widely acknowledged as a 
successful tool in achieving greater financial inclusion, one of the numerous channels through 
which mobile phones spur growth in underserved communities. Financial inclusion has very high 
potential to raise incomes and improve living standards. This article mentioned above provides a 
basis for expecting a positive relationship between the dependent and main independent variables 
used in my panel regression analysis. Here, the academic dilemma is as follows: is mobile phone 
usage correlated with productivity growth or financial inclusion correlated with growth? 
According to the work of Wamboye et. al. (2016), mobile phone penetration has a positive effect 
on economic growth, controlling for financial inclusion. 
Although many people in the developing world, particularly Africa, do not have access to 
formal bank accounts that are known for security and reliability, a growing number are now using 
mobile phones as alternatives to traditional systems (Kunt and Klepper, 2012). There is a 
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significant rise in the use mobile money services, also known as "branchless banking," which has 
allowed millions to perform various economic transactions affordably and reliably as well. In sub-
Saharan Africa, mobile money has made the most progress. It is reported that just under 20 percent 
of adults use a mobile phone to pay bills or send or receive money, thereby enhancing economic 
activity (Kunt and Klepper, 2012). Mobile phones allow transactions to happen faster and more 
efficiently in these underserved parts of the world compared to when they are not adopted. In 
Kenya specifically, where the M-PESA service was commercially launched in 2007, 68% of adults 
report using such mobile money platforms and when looking at Africa at large, more than 20% of 
adults report using mobile money (Kunt and Klepper, 2012). If such huge parts of the population 
are using mobile phones for financial services at such rates, then they are indeed adding to 
economic growth by harnessing the efficiencies associated with using mobile technology.  
To confirm that mobile-cellular subscriptions indeed influence economic growth through 
financial inclusion, Andrianaivo and Kpodar (2012) do a panel study of 44 African countries from 
1988 to 2007. This study analyzes the impact of mobile phone penetration on economic growth 
rates in Africa by adding to the regression model an indicator for financial inclusion. The authors 
find that mobile phone penetration indeed contributes to economic growth in Africa. Specifically, 
an additional 10 percent increase in penetration rate results in 0.6 percent increase in real GDP 
growth. Here, the dependent variable is real GDP growth unlike Wamboye et. al. (2016) who 
measure labor productivity growth. Nonetheless, the results are consistent with expected findings. 
Bringing to light the role of financial inclusion to this growth, they find that the coefficients of its 
indicators; measured as the number of deposits per head and the number of loans per head, are 
positive and significant.  This means that greater financial inclusion, made possible by improved 
mobile penetration, results in economic growth in African economies. 
9 
 
While Andrianaivo and Kpodar (2012) make a major addition to their regression model to 
test whether financial inclusion is one of the channels in which mobile phone development 
stimulates economic growth, their approach is not perfect. They add to their economic growth 
model a variable of financial inclusion measured by either number of loans or deposits per head. 
However, this might give a limited view of the extent of which financial inclusion is impactful. A 
measure based on these two metrics alone, as Sarma (2015) argues, "effectively quantifies only 
one [or two] aspects of financial inclusion...and ignores other aspects, such as availability, 
affordability, quality and usage." This necessitates an alternative, more comprehensive approach. 
That is why Sarma (2015) propose an index of financial inclusion (IFI) - a comprehensive, 
meaningful, and mathematically robust measure comprising of quantifiable dimensions of an 
inclusive financial system. This suggestion can result in more improved findings than in earlier 
studies, which either used limited measures of financial inclusion like Andrianaivo and Kpodar 
(2012) or did not include it at all in the economic growth model with respect to mobile phone 
Despite these concerns, there is enough evidence to suggest that financial inclusion is one 
important avenue in which mobile phones can spur growth in developing countries. While 
literature currently does not yet give an assertive voice when it comes the necessary penetration 
rates such that increasing returns occur, mobile phones can ensure financial inclusion for those 
that would have otherwise not had access to basic transaction account services. This is especially 
important at a time when The World Bank strongly emphasizes broader financial inclusion because 
of its capacity to raise incomes and end poverty. Mobile phones are relatively affordable and 
accessible to more and more users in developing countries. They are a proven platform to ensure 
this desired broader financial inclusion. 
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2.2 Agriculture 
Many developing countries rely on the agricultural sector for economic growth objectives. 
The developmental state model adopted by the "miracle economies" of East Asia in the latter half 
of the 20th Century shows this phenomenon. The trend was typically as follows: gain independence 
from colonizer, redistribute land to economically empower the masses, then use surpluses from 
agriculture to invest in the industrial sector – thereby achieving a "miraculous" path towards 
economic growth and development. This trend was also observed in some African countries who 
attained independence a while later, suggesting that the agricultural sector, when productive 
enough, can be the basis on which an economy thrives. At the same time, it is conventional wisdom 
that technology has the power to boost agricultural outcomes. Mobile phone technology, in 
particular, has been proven to enhance agricultural activities and yields in developing countries 
(Zanello, 2012). Therefore, by improving agricultural outcomes, holding all else constant, mobile 
phones can add to the economic growth of developing countries.  
In Zanello's (2012) study, the authors focus on Northern Ghana's agricultural regions to 
examine the impact of information communication technologies (mobile phones and radios in this 
case) on economic transactions and participation in food crop markets. They do this using 
agricultural season 2008 to 2009 survey data from 393 households in the region. The authors use 
a multi-stage sampling procedure with various categories based on the respondent's primary role 
in the market: "buyes, net-buyers, sellers, net-sellers, autarchies (non-traders)" (Zanello, 2012). 
The collected data are used to build a probit model to indicate the impact on net-sellers and net-
buyers. They find that households that receive price information via mobile phones are 
significantly more active in the market despite being smallholders with either deficit or surplus of 
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food. On top of that, farmers that rely on mobile phones for information are more likely to see 
reductions in search costs – thereby maximizing profits.  
However, while  Zanello (2012) gives evidence for the economic advantages of using 
mobile phone technology in the agricultural sector of one country, the scale of the study seems too 
small to support the thesis of this paper. Zanello (2012) focuses on micro-level analysis – only 
survey data for one agricultural season for one developing country, Ghana. A more comprehensive 
study could look at more than one geographical location and or for a longer period of time to see 
if there are robust trends or patterns. Other than that, a comment must be made about the author's 
choice to aggregate and treat different kinds of crop (grain and legumes) as single output. This is 
done to make it easier to separate overall selling costs from transaction costs, thereby identifying 
areas for value addition by mobile phones. But while treating different kinds of crop as single 
output is intended to make calculations easier, the results may not be reliable. It may make it hard 
to determine with precision the markets that are more responsive to mobile phone development 
than others. Perhaps maintaining the integrity of the crop in calculations may give a more nuanced 
view of the association between agricultural output and mobile technology proliferation.  
Even in India, information and communication technology penetration has improved 
agricultural outcomes (Jensen, 2007). Using micro-level survey data between 1997 and 2001, the 
author finds that adoption of mobile phones by fishermen and wholesalers in India's fishing 
industry is associated with "dramatic" reductions in price dispersion in the market. Price dispersion 
is problematic because it can result in misallocation of resources due to information asymmetry. 
Besides the dramatic reduction in price dispersion, mobile phone adoption in the region of study 
is also associated with the complete elimination of waste and almost perfect adherence to the Law 
of One Price (Jensen, 2007). The Law of One Price states that the price of a commodity is the same 
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even when exchange rates are considered. When this happens, the market is efficient. This shows 
the potential impact of information and communication technology growth on agriculture in 
developing countries. Based on this study, there are observable and clear welfare gains experienced 
in the marketplace due to mobile phone adoption. This is because mobile phones reduce cost of 
accessing critical market information that allows users to make rational decisions, which will then 
ultimately translate into economic growth and development. 
However, Jensen's (2007) study was based on mobile phone adoption that happened in a 
series of stages or phases in the region of study. This could be problematic in that in practice, 
mobile phone proliferation does not typically happen in stages. Proliferation is as continuous as it 
is random. Perhaps a more strategic method would involve a randomized assessment of the rate of 
mobile phone adoption. While the author seems to acknowledge this concern about the 
methodology, the response may still leave the reader doubting the robustness of the study. The 
author mentions that nonrandom nature of mobile phone adoption in this region is not much of a 
concern given how they "do not see any differential trends, or large changes in the price series at 
any points in time other than when phones were introduced..." (Jensen, 2007). The assumption 
behind this claim is that there were no other observable factors contributing to price changes with 
increase in mobile phone adoption. But what if there may have been other factors affecting price 
changes that they may have overlooked? 
Nonetheless, there is enough evidence to give the author some benefit of the doubt for 
attempting to address this concern. There is even more than enough evidence to show the economic 
benefits of mobile phone adoption. These information access and cost reduction benefits observed 
in the agricultural sector in developing countries are largely due to network effects. The network 
effects or increasing returns phenomenon is discussed below. 
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2.3 Network effects 
The answer to why mobile phone proliferation seems to have such a “dramatic” impact on 
economic growth and development in low-income countries lies in network effects Aker and Mbiti 
(2010). Aker and Mbiti (2010) find that the increase in mobile phone usage can have “dramatic” 
effects on the economy, especially in rural Africa in it that reduces information search costs, risk, 
generates of employment, and improves coordination among firms. These advantages of mobile 
phone usage can have a significant impact on the economy. For instance, in most of rural Africa 
in the case of emergency or any other shocks to the market, it is assumed that kinship plays a role 
in the manner in which responses to these events are carried out. This may, however, be time-
consuming and costly. Mobile phones provide a quick and cheap way of dispersing critical 
information in this case. Therefore, increased mobile phone usage is associated with positive 
welfare gains for these communities. 
At the same time, without an explicit OLS method used for this study, the reader might be 
confused by Aker and Mbiti’s approach in terms of specific relationships among the measures they 
chose to focus on. However, their study still suffices to show the nature of the relationship between 
mobile phone proliferation and economic development in low-income countries. It also gives the 
reader an opportunity to understand further the channels through which mobile phones are 
practically beneficial to low-income countries. In this context, mobile phones are not simply a 
communication tool, but have the potential to add to the broader economy. 
In order to quantify and track these network effects, the work of Wamboye et. al. (2015) 
uses a different method: OLS panel regression model. Before discussing their numerical findings, 
the author argues that the social benefits of information and communication technology 
infrastructure and services outweigh the private benefits. When this happens, there are positive 
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externalities. The larger the number of people subscribed to a mobile cellular service, there more 
the information is shared and spread through the productivity-boosting mobile platforms related 
to agriculture, healthcare, financial services, and so on. One could think of positive externalities 
associated with mobile phone proliferation in terms of immunization. When more people are 
immunized for a particular disease in society, the lower the rate of infections. There will be lower 
medical treatment costs as well as reduced costs due to loss of life.  
The sentiments expressed in this by Wamboye et. al. (2015) echo Acker and Mbiti (2010) 
discussion of network effects. The observed increasing returns to real output per worker can be 
explained by these network effects. Wamboye et. al. (2015) conduct a panel study of 43 Sub-
Saharan African countries between 1975 and 2010 to examine the impact of information and 
communication technologies on labor productivity and growth. Besides including a quadratic 
function, the authors also use a nonparametric model to show and determine the specific thresholds 
for these network effects. They find, consistent with other studies, that fixed-line and mobile 
telecommunications have a positive and significant impact on growth after penetration rates reach 
a certain critical mass. Specifically, penetrations rates of between 20% and 30% for telephones 
and 5% for internet usage result in increasing returns on real output per worker. The author writes 
that in particular, an increase by 10 percent in the penetration rate of fixed-line telephones lowers 
productivity growth by approximately 3.17%-3.42% annually over the subsequent 3 years. 
Doubling that rate to 20 percentage points increases growth by roughly 0.12%-0.15%. These 
increasing return effects on labor productivity growth are also observed when the measure of 
information and communication technologies is expressed as the sum of the mobile cellular and 
fixed-line telephone subscriptions. These numerical findings give more weight to the value of 
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Acker and Mbiti's (2010) study, which contains no OLS regression but some rather limited 
descriptive statistics.  
These network effects are observed on a larger scale by the work of Gruber and Pantelis 
(2011). In this study, the authors use annual data from a sample of 192 countries over the period 
1990 to 2007 to assess the impact of mobile telecommunications on economic growth. Gruber and 
Pantelis (2011) use simultaneous equations to formulate a model, which links national aggregate 
economic output to a set of production factors in each country - in particular the stock of capital, 
labor, and the stock of mobile and fixed telecommunications infrastructure. This is done to account 
for reverse causality concerns. Just like Wamboye et. al. (2015), Gruber and Pantelis (2011) also 
find that once the level around 30% penetration has been achieved, economies earn a lot more 
from the same infrastructure compared to their previous returns, providing evidence from 
increasing returns from mobile phone adoption. 
As shown, these two studies provide an explanation for the existence of network effects, 
despite their differences in methodology. From the onset, Wamboye et. al.  (2015) use real output 
per worker on the LHS of their model while Gruber and Pantelis (2011) use real output of the 
country as a function of capital, labor, and telecommunications infrastructure to deal with causality 
concerns. Gruber and Pantelis (2011) assess a larger sample of countries and assess the economic 
impact of mobile technologies based on countries’ income level. But even with a larger sample 
size, Gruber and Pantelis's (2011) methodology to analyze network effects seems misplaced. They 
create three dummy variables to indicate low, medium, and high mobile penetration levels. The 
rational here is that throughout their period of study (1990 – 2007), most countries started either 
at zero or slightly above mobile penetration. Countries then moved to high penetration rates at 
different speeds. The authors, then, divide their sample into three equal groups of 320 mobile 
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penetrations observations each: 0 to 5 percent, 5 to 30 percent, and lastly 30 percent and more. 
This raises a few concerns. First, the range of these dummy variables is different across the three 
groups. The reader can get easily confused about the choice of these ranges since the authors offer 
no explanation about how they came to be. Also, in response to Gruber and Pantelis's (2011) paper, 
one economist (Mayer, 2011) writes, "it does not seem totally implausible that the within variance 
[of the dummy variables] is much smaller in and medium categories, potentially explaining the 
difference in coefficients, which should be standardized in one way or the other." These concerns 
give good reason why we should not accept these critical mass (network effects) results at face 
value. The percent penetration rates are easy to understand as a measure of proliferation – simply 
usage expressed in association with population size of the country. But having equal observations 
in three clusters of different ranges of penetration is difficult to grapple with at this point.  
Even when a distinction is made in terms of where a country falls on the low-to-high-
income spectrum, different results should be expected with respect to increase in information and 
communications technology development. Particularly: “impact is smaller for countries with a low 
mobile penetration, usually low-income countries. While in low-income countries the mobile 
telecommunications contribution to annual GDP growth is 0.11%, for high-income countries this 
is 0.20%” (Gruber and Pantelis, 2011). Another study also shows similar results. Meijers (2013) 
assesses the relationship between internet use and economic growth between high and low-income 
countries. Given that recent cross-country panel data studies find a positive impact of internet use 
on economic growth and a positive impact of internet use on trade, the author challenges current 
models that prove that internet use is associated with economic growth in a fully specified model. 
Instead, internet use impacts trade, and then trade impacts economic growth. Therefore, the author 
presents a simultaneous equations model to show this phenomenon. The model shows that internet 
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use is more impactful on trade in lower-income countries compared to high income countries. At 
the same time, impact of internet use on economic growth is the same for both kinds of countries. 
Results based on country’s income level can be linked to the network effects (increasing 
returns) concept. Low-income countries show “dramatic” returns on productivity from smaller 
proportionate increases in mobile proliferation. High-income countries show relatively higher 
returns on real output growth (and not productivity) over time. The implications are that low-
income countries should aim for specific (critical) levels of proliferation in order to experience 
higher levels of real output growth over time.  
 
2.4 Women empowerment  
The observed effective critical mass results confirm that the size of the network matters. 
However, it is not only the size of the network that matters. It is also important to consider who 
participates within the network. It is important to note that there are 300 million fewer women 
globally than men who own mobile devices (West, 2012). Globally, there is a 21 percent gender 
gap in owning a phone. When looking at specific parts of the world, there are some disparities:  23 
percent in Africa, 24 percent in the Middle East, and 37 percent in Asia. Women where such 
disparities exist do not have the same opportunities as their male counterparts in different aspects 
of life. They quite often do not enjoy the same legal and economic advantages that help men thrive 
in their business endeavors. Information and communications technology development and 
adoption helps solve this problem as found by West (2012). Information and communication 
technologies help train female students to become entrepreneurs. On top of that, the survey done 
by the Development Fund found out that 55 percent of women around the world earned extra 
income because of owning a mobile cellular device. More than 40 percent increased their income 
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and got the opportunity to engage in other professional opportunities. This shows that mobile 
phone technologies enable women and other disadvantaged groups access to markets; suppliers, 
customers, and other critical resources which could otherwise require physical transport. They 
therefore provide access to resources and markets free of discriminatory gender biases. Women 
can become more autonomous entities in the household by making use of these opportunities 
availed to them by the relatively more accessible and cheaper mobile phones compared to 
traditional financial institutions for instance.  
Suri and Jack (2016) explore the economic benefits of using M-PESA, a mobile phone 
financial services platform in Kenya. They find that mobile phone usage provides access to basic 
financial services to households that would otherwise be financially excluded. The survey they 
carried out over several years shows that usage lifted about two percent of the population out of 
poverty together with improving women empowerment. The expansion of M-PESA (M is for 
mobile and pesa is the Swahili word for money) was particularly beneficial to women, who through 
the new system gained access to a new way of sending and receiving money. They observed that 
when M-PESA came to an area, women shifted their occupations and their savings increased as 
well. About 185,000 women shifted occupations from subsistence farming to business or retail 
sales, shifting to more sustainable sources of living. Mobile money has therefore increased the 
efficiency of the spending and consumption patterns and, at the same time, facilitating more 
improved labor markets, resulting in a significant reduction of poverty in Kenya. This evidence 
shows that mobile phones give women more autonomy in the household. Mobile phone usage adds 
to economic growth because it empowers women who would otherwise not participate in economic 
activity as suggested by the findings in Kenya by Jack and Suri (2016).  
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A separate study in Ghana found almost similar results: there is a significant positive 
relationship between the microfinance provided through mobile phones and women 
empowerment, suggesting that financial inclusion has both economic and social benefits for 
women (Addai, 2017). Addai (2017) uses purposive non-probability sampling technique with a 
sample size of 500 microfinance customers from Ashanti, Greater Accra, Central, Eastern and 
Western Regions of Ghana (100 from each region).  In this study, structured questionnaires are 
used to understand better the livelihood of these women with respect to financial services. They 
find that both age and level of education influence whether more micro-financial services lead to 
improved economic empowerment of women. On the other hand, the dummy variable; marital 
status also matters in that married women are less likely to be economically empowered from 
microfinance. However, such a small sample size in the work of Addai (2017) may be inadequate 
to see the fundamental associations between mobile phone adoption and empowerment of women. 
These findings suggest that although financial inclusion has the potential to make women 
more economically active, and thereby contribute to the economic growth of their communities, it 
cannot be impactful due to some cultural values or beliefs which limit women’s participation in 
the economy. In some societies today, women are still not considered as equal to men in the 
household. As a result, some women get left behind when it comes to service provision. Ultimately, 
these communities lose out by excluding women in accessing financial services that promote 
economic growth. As a solution, in order to fully harness the productive potential of financial 
inclusion in developing communities, there needs to be a paradigm shift such that women have 
access to the same services as men. Particularly, service providers could hold workshops in 
communities where women are underrepresented so as to educate all members on the benefits of 
having everyone have equal access to financial products and services. If the excuse is that some 
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women do not have access because they cannot afford mobile connection devices, then service 
provides can subsidize them to encourage usage.  
 
3. Capital Accumulation 
Mobile phone and internet proliferation is associated with increase in capital accumulation 
in that the information and communication technology sector is inherently capital intensive 
(Andrianaivo and Kpodar, 2012). At the same time, there are opportunities for "diffusion" of 
technologies needed in the provision of mobile phone services. For instance, establishing a mobile 
phone network requires large investments in computer and other information technology hardware, 
communications software and equipment. Therefore, investment in mobile phone technology 
could be one way in which developing countries may speed up their rate of overall technology 
adoption. Nonetheless, mobile phone proliferation can also add to physical capital accumulation 
in that a strong information and technology infrastructure may encourage foreign direct investment 
(Andrianaivo and Kpodar, 2012). More foreign direct investments in turn result higher in physical 
capital accumulation, which is necessary for economic growth in developing countries.  
However, not all capital accumulation leads to growth. Andrianaivo and Kpodar (2012) 
acknowledge that mobile phone proliferation can also lead to faster depreciation of capital. This is 
because investments are directed more towards information technology equipment, which 
inherently depreciates at fast rates. In such a case, capital accumulation may negatively impact 
economic growth and productivity. Even beyond this argument, King and Levine (1993) present a 
different way of measuring economic growth to emphasize that not all capital accumulation is 
good for growth. King and Levine (1993) use a production function with predetermined 
parameters; decomposing the measure for economic growth to show a separation between rate of 
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physical capital accumulation, and rate of growth of "everything else." This separation ensures that 
analysts get a better understanding of the effect of capital accumulation on productivity and 
growth.   
 
4. Opportunity Costs 
There are also opportunity costs associated with mobile phone proliferation in developing 
countries (Heeks, 1999). Developing countries lag when it comes to provision of other services 
such as electricity and education. When such services are lacking, internet and mobile technology 
may reach only a few people. If the population is largely illiterate, and there is inadequate power 
supply needed to support information and communication technologies, then only a few can 
benefit from these mobile phone service investments. This is because users need to be literate and 
have some level of intellectual capacity to such that usage of mobile technologies is economically 
productive. This is consistent with the findings of Addai (2017) regarding women empowerment. 
At the same time, one could also view the opportunity cost of investment in mobile phone 
proliferation as investments in electricity supply and education provision. While this is an 
interesting perspective, one should keep in mind the respective weights or share of gross domestic 
product of what these investments in these sectors are. This will give more clarity in assessing 
whether investments in mobile phone proliferation come in the way developments of other sectors.  
Heeks (1999) also suggests that even if sectors like education and electricity provision are 
improved in developing countries, the poor still face challenges in harnessing the potential of 
information and communication technology proliferation. This is because these technologies 
require money to buy, access, use, and maintain them. For instance, one needs money to buy a 
mobile phone and then money to pay for cellular services as well. This again will make only a few 
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be able to benefit from mobile phone proliferation. Taken from the opportunity cost stand point, 
large investments in information and technology infrastructure may result in small investments in 
poverty alleviation programs. Also, money used to buy mobile phones and to pay for cellular 
services may be otherwise used to purchase food. At the time when Heeks published his study, 
there probably was good reason to believe that there was this opportunity cost indeed. This is 
because the more recent works of Suri and Jack (2016) do not reflect these opportunity costs. Suri 
and Jack (2016) provide evidence that mobile phone proliferation can lift the poor out of poverty. 
This of course happens through mobile financial service platforms such as M-PESA, as already 
highlighted above. The poverty alleviation effects of mobile phone proliferation are also 
guaranteed by women empowerment. Women who would be economically unproductive in the 
absence of mobile phone technology become empowered in the entrepreneurial sense and 
ultimately add to increase in household income. This implies that there is no opportunity cost of 
mobile phone proliferation in terms of poverty alleviation efforts. The other possibility is that there 
is no need of lifting people out of poverty first to benefit from information and communication 
technology growth.  
 
5. Data, Variables, and Model 
For my panel regression analysis, I formulate two panel equations below such that I 
experiment and analyze results in these different situations or combination of variables. The 
precise distinction between the two models is that one is linear while the other is quadratic. The 
choice of the variables is largely based on the work of Wamboye (2016) as well as from other 
studies discussed above. All data come from the World Bank Development Indicators and Doing 
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Business databases.  Using data from 73 countries over the period 2000-2016, the goal is to see 
whether mobile phone proliferation leads to higher productivity in developing countries.  
 
Definition and Discussion of Variables: 
Yit is the natural log of GDP per capita in country i over time t, which is gross domestic 
product divided by midyear population of the country. This is the dependent variable of the model 
on the left-hand side of the panel regression model (equation). This economic indicator is not 
largely different from Wamboye et. al. (2016), who use the natural log of real output per worker 
growth (three-year averaged) in country i over time t. Wamboye et. al. (2016) focus on labor 
productivity outcomes while I use real output per person. Essentially, these two seemingly 
different variables indicate the same thing: productivity.  
On the right-hand side, the main independent variable is Penrate. Penrate is the rate of 
mobile phone penetration in a country. This is expressed as the number of active mobile 
subscriptions to a public cellular service provider divided by the midyear population of the country. 
After Penrate, Broadband represents the fixed broadband subscriptions (per 100 people) in the 
country. Higher access to broadband or wired internet in general means that communication 
necessary for flow of information among economic agents is increasing and this in turn should 
boost economic activity and growth. Penrate and Broadband are good indicators of the extent of 
general technological adoption and development in these developing countries. Wamboye et. al. 
(2016) have their main independent variable as a measure that includes three "technology adoption 
variables": fixed telephone subscriptions, mobile-cellular subscriptions, and internet users. For this 
study, I treat Penrate and Broadband separately due to data constraints. However, just like 
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Wamboye et. al. (2016), and consistent with other previous literature, I also add a quadratic term 
for Penrate, taking network effects into account.  
The other non-technological control variables are G, FDI, I, DTSB, Edu, and Open. G 
represents the government final consumption expenditure expressed as percentage of the country's 
gross domestic product. According to Wamboye et. al. (2016), high budget deficits are problematic 
because they negatively impact capital accumulation and productivity. At the same time, 
government spending can be used to stimulate output and growth during economic downturns. As 
long as intervention is not politically motivated or leads to corruption or other non-economic 
activities, government spending can have a positive impact on long-run productivity growth. This 
makes the case for why G is also included in my model. While Wamboye et. al. (2016) expect G 
to either add or diminish labor productivity growth, I assess G's impact on per capita income over 
time.  
Next to G is the variable I which is a measure of gross capital formation (formally known 
as domestic investment according to the World Bank), expressed as a percentage of gross domestic 
product. The longer definition for I includes "Fixed assets include land improvements (fences, 
ditches, drains, and so on); plant, machinery, and equipment purchase; and the construction of 
roads, railways, and the like, including schools, offices, hospitals, private residential dwellings, 
and commercial and industrial buildings..."(World Bank, 2018). I therefore is a comprehensive 
measure of physical capital accumulation, which also adds to economic growth. Literature and 
economic theory supports the thesis that high savings and investment rates are a prerequisite for 
rapid economic growth (Meijers, 2014). Developing (low-income) countries that can save and 
invest more should see relatively more economic growth those that do otherwise, holding all else 
constant. 
25 
 
FDI is net inflows of foreign direct investment in the country, also expressed as a 
percentage of gross domestic product like G and FDI. Long-term private international capital flows 
(FDI) can strengthen domestic productivity (Wamboye et. al., 2016). This is because FDI allows 
or contributes to skills and knowledge transfer, employment creation, and export led growth, 
among other benefits. There are efficiency gains associated with the rapid adoption of technology 
that happens when foreign direct investments flow into the country. I assume that all these 
advantages ultimately lead to per capita income increase.  
My contribution to literature, DTSB (days to start a business) is the time required to legally 
start operating a business in a country. The variable is expressed as the actual number of business 
days needed to begin operations, which is just one of the many other measures that indicate the 
ease of doing business in a country. The ease of conducting business or productive economic 
activity in an economy also affects the rate at which economies grow and develop. For this 
analysis, the indicator used to reflect this easiness is DTSB. A high number of DTSB may also 
discourage foreign direct investments, which are crucial for the rapid growth and development of 
low-income countries. According to Djankov et al. (2006), business regulations have a significant 
impact on annual economic growth. Djankov et al. (2006) assess business regulations in 135 
countries and find that improving from the worst quartile to the best quartile can translate into 2.3 
percent increase in annual growth. Typically, developing (low-income) countries score lower in 
terms of measures that indicate the ease of "doing business" compared to their developed 
counterparts. Given that the results of Djankov et al.'s (2016) study are significant even when 
controlling for other factors such as trade and investments, developing countries could experience 
higher rates of growth and productivity by establishing business friendly regulations and or 
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environments. I use the same World Bank Doing Business database as Djankov et al. (2006) to 
obtain data on DTSB.  
Edu is the gross enrollment ratio in tertiary education regardless of age, to the population 
of the age group that corresponds to the level of education shown. Educational attainment 
influences how attractive the human capital base is in a country (Wamboye et. al., 2016). Countries 
with high levels of education and or human capital can attract more foreign investment, holding 
all else constant. High human capital levels imply that the economically active can learn foreign 
concepts, skills, and technologies, which they can translate into domestic innovations. Assuming 
that the higher the level of education attained, the more attractive is the country to foreign direct 
investment, I use tertiary education whereas Wamboye et. al. (2016) use primary education. 
Meijers (2014) uses secondary school enrollment (% gross) while focusing on internet use 
(proliferation) and not mobile phone penetration.  
Open is a measure of the openness to trade of the country. Openness to trade is also 
generally accepted as a way in which developing countries can achieve faster growth. Trade with 
other countries encourages competition and innovation necessary for development. Developing 
countries also benefit from international trade in that they can access and adopt certain successful 
technologies and processes used abroad. But just as with government spending, not all 
international trade is beneficial due to the infant industry/protectionist argument. Meijers (2014) 
have their openness to trade variable as openness ratio trade as a percentage of GDP defined as: 
imports plus exports of goods and services (% gdp). In my model, the variable is expressed as only 
as taxes on imports as a percentage of gross domestic product due to data limitations. The 
assumption here is that the higher the tax on imports revenue is as a percentage of gross domestic 
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product, the more open to trade the country is. And based on Wamboye et. al. (2016a; 2016b), this 
is good for economic growth purposes, especially when using East Asia as a case study.  
With these variables, I construct two panel regression models as shown below: Equation 
(1) is a linear model testing whether mobile phone proliferation has any impact on economic 
growth in low-income countries. Equation (2) is a non-linear expression with similar variables as 
the first model.  
Linear model: 
 
Non-linear model: 
 
 
Expected Signs of Regression Coefficients 
Based on the work of Wamboye et.al. (2016), holding all else constant, I expect to find a 
positive sign between the dependent variable Y and independent variable Penrate both the linear 
and the non-linear models. As discussed above, an increase in mobile phone proliferation should 
add to per capita gross domestic product. In the non-linear model however, where Penrate is raised 
to the second power, I expect to see a negative sign behind Penrate2  to reflect increasing returns 
(network effects) to the economic growth variable of the model. Graphically, the non-linear model 
would be n-shaped and shows these network effects.  
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As for the independent variables, in both the linear and quadratic models, I expect to see a 
positive relationship between Y and Broadband as more access to fixed or wired internet should 
have a similar effect on growth as Penrate, in both models. The main assumption here is: generally, 
developing countries benefit from an increase in having access to more information and 
telecommunications services, which include mobile cellular and fixed or wired internet 
technologies.  
For reasons already discussed above, the expected sign for government spending on final 
consumption as percentage of gross domestic product (G) is hard to predict without running the 
regression first. The aggregate macro-economic output equation contains government spending in 
the economy, suggesting that more government spending in developing countries should boost 
economic growth. However, not all government spending adds to growth. For this reason, I use 
the results of the regression to formulate informed policy implications with respect to government 
spending.  
The expected sign for I (the indicator for overall domestic investment) is positive. The 
expected sign for FDI is positive. As already discussed, foreign and domestic investments add to 
the economic growth and development of low-income countries.  
It is also not unreasonable to expect a positive sign for the variable Edu. Just as they rely 
on physical capital to meet growth objectives, developing countries need a strong human capital 
base for the same reason. However, Wamboye et. al. (2016) argue that it is hard to also predict the 
sign for Edu.  Therefore, results from the regression are also used to formulate recommendations 
with respect to educational attainment.  
For my model, the expected sign for the variable that indicates openness to trade is not 
predicted. This is because "while the success stories from the export-led growth of East Asian 
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economies lend some support to the beneficial effects of trade openness...most sub-Saharan 
African countries are net importers...their export sectors are characterized by primary commodity 
production and agriculture-based manufacturing, with potentially neutral or detrimental effects on 
productivity growth" (Wamboye et. al., 2016). This means that if the same assumption is extended 
to Latin America and the Carribean (low-income countries), I have good reason to expect either a 
negative or positive sign for Open regression coefficient. Also, when it comes to trade openness, 
if Open does not add to per capita output increase, that is if the coefficient happens to be negative 
based on results, then one possible explanation why this may be the case is the infant industry 
(protectionist) argument. It could be that these developing countries mostly engage in trade that 
hurts emerging domestic industries, which are not yet mature enough to compete on the global 
scale. Another reason why engaging in foreign trade may not be necessarily adding to growth is 
that these developing countries may be producing low-value added goods and services, which do 
not bring back significant domestic economic gains.  
Lastly, the expected sign for DTSB is negative because based on the definition of this 
variable, a higher number of days needed to legally start conducting business should slow down 
economic activity and growth.  
Robustness Checks 
For this analysis I check for multicollinearity for the linear model and all variables have a 
variance inflation factor (VIF) of less than 5. With a mean VIF of less 1.8 (see Table 1 below), the 
degree of multicollinearity among variables is minimal, giving no reason to drop any variables. 
Given that I conduct a panel regression analysis, I also run the Hausman Test to see whether I 
should pick the random effects or fixed effects model. Based on the Hausman Test, the p-value 
(0.0001) implies that the random effects and fixed effects coefficients of my analysis are not 
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necessarily similar. Therefore, the null hypothesis is rejected such that I pick the fixed effects 
model for analysis and discussion. This is of course the non-liner (quadratic) model that shows the 
network effects as already discussed above.  
Also, to correct for autocorrelation, STATA drops the variable I in both OLS regressions 
used in my study.  
Overall, the model does seem robust. The R-squared value of 57 percent in the quadratic 
model shows slightly above half of the observed variance in the dependent variable can be 
explained by the independent variables in the quadratic model. At this level, there is further proof 
that there is minimal autocorrelation in the model. See Table 1 in the Appendix section for 
multicollinearity test results. 
Summary Statistics: See Table 2 in Appendix 
6. Regression results 
Refer to Table 3 in Appendix: Assessing the impact of mobile phone proliferation on gdp 
per capita in Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America and Caribbean (excluding high-income 
countries). 
 
Discussion of Results  
As shown, the results in Table 3 (refer to Appendix) seem to help in answering the research 
question. Based on these results, increase in mobile phone penetration leads to an increase in 
economic growth, which is consistent with literature. This is confirmed by the positive sign for the 
coefficient for Penrate. And based on my regression analysis, this variable is also statistically 
significant at the one percent level of confidence. Also consistent with previous studies is the 
finding that the nature of the increase in economic growth, when expressed as per capita income 
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growth, is such that it is somewhat exponential. Therefore, the coefficient for Penrate2 is negative, 
reflecting the n-shaped nature of the model typical in relationships where increasing returns 
(network effects) are present. Holding all else constant, gross domestic product per capita will 
increase with increase in mobile penetration rate, but only to a certain point. Afterwards, further 
increases in penetration rate results in a decrease in gross domestic product per capita. The 
quadratic term for Penrate confirms network effects. Wamboye et. al. (2016) results show 
expected signs for the coefficient of fixed telephone plus mobile-cellular subscriptions. Their 
coefficients in the linear and quadratic terms confirm increasing returns to mobile-cellular 
telephones. Increasing the combined fixed-telephone and mobile-cellular penetration rate by 10 
percent reduces productivity growth by 1.72–1.97 percent annually. When the rate is doubled, it 
adds to growth by 0.02 per cent.  Andrianaivo and Kpodar (2011) did not find these increasing 
returns, citing that network effects are most likely present, but they could not be observed by the 
end of their sampling period.  I also find presence of network effects in that, as shown in Table 1, 
an increase in Penrate by one percentage point results in gross domestic product per capita increase 
by 1.16 percentage points. Adding the quadratic terms shows that an increase in Penrate by one 
percent results in increase in output per capita by 2.6 percent. Both my and Wamboye et. al. (2016) 
results are statistically significant even at the one percent level of significance.  
The coefficient for Broadband is also promising, despite being statistically insignificant in 
this analysis. Broadband coefficients confirm that more proliferation of information and 
communication technologies in developing countries is a key prerequisite for economic growth. 
Broadband coefficients in my study, however, are not statistically significant, not even at the 10 
percent level of significance. Wamboye et. al. (2016) fixed broadband coefficients are statistically 
significant at the 5 percent level of significance.  
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While the variable I has been omitted to account for autocorrelation, the results also show 
expected signs for the other control variables FDI, Edu, Open and DTSB. Even though foreign 
direct investment is not statistically significant, how well educated a population is statistically 
robust, confirming the results of Addai (2017). These results are consistent with the Heeks (1999) 
argument that mobile technology adoption in developing countries requires an educated or literate 
user base, which can fully harness its growth-promoting potential. Edu also shows similar results 
as Wamboye et. al. (2016) who acknowledge that fruitful adoption of new technologies such as 
information and communication technologies, has in the past required a skilled workforce, or high 
levels of formal education. In my study, Edu measured as the gross enrollment ratio of tertiary 
education, shows significant results. Therefore, a well-educated population base will add to the 
human capital needed to meet economic objectives in developing countries.   
In my study, FDI and Open, also known as the "technology transfer" indicators according 
to Wamboye et. al. (2016a; 2015b), have coefficients that are not robust enough to confirm that 
developing countries, on top of information and communications technology proliferation, rely on 
foreign investments and opening trade to experience economic growth. This is unlike Wamboye 
et. al. (2016a; 2015b) who find robust growth enhancing effects of these two variables across 
various model specifications in their analysis. For instance, a ten percent rise in foreign direct 
investments as a share of total gross domestic product boosts labor productivity growth by about 
5 percent per year for the next three years (Wamboye et. al. 2016). My results show that an increase 
in mobile penetration rate by one percent boosts output per person by a proportionately smaller 
margin compared to the results of Wamboye et. al. (2016). The answer to these subtle differences 
lies in methodology. 
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It is not surprising, however, that based on this analysis, holding all else constant, there is 
an inverse relationship between government spending and per capita gross domestic product in 
developing countries. There could be quite a few explanations for the unexpected coefficient for 
G. One possible explanation is that government spending in developing countries may not 
necessarily be directed towards economically productive activities. There are large losses to real 
gross domestic product due to corruption. Wamboye et. al. (2016) cite that huge budget deficits 
can have a negative impact on productivity and capital accumulation. During periods of recession, 
government spending can be used to stimulate economic growth by boosting demand. But 
corruption and politically driven expenditure may hinder growth. In my model, government 
spending is statistically robust and may confirm the argument of high budget deficits in low-
income countries. The sign and coefficient robustness are similar to Wamboye et. al. (2016) results 
as well.  
The value-addition variable, DTSB, also shows promising results in my model. I obtain the 
expected negative sign based on Djankov et al. (2016) findings. Djankov et al. (2016) use several 
indicators from the Word Bank Doing Business database including measures for starting a 
business, hiring and firing, registration processes, access to credit, legal framework, and closing a 
business. In my model I focus only on starting a business, specifically the number of calendar days 
need to complete all necessary procedures before beginning operations. The negative coefficient 
confirms that the higher number of days needed, that is, the longer it takes before being legally 
established, affects the ease of doing business in the country. It is therefore within the best interest 
of developing countries to improve their regulatory and business environments, which can quickly 
attract investments necessary for growth.   
7. Conclusion 
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This work adds to the growing body of literature supporting mobile phone usage in 
developing countries. Mobile phones do raise output per capita or productivity in low-income 
countries. I confirm presence of network effects with respect to mobile technology adoption. On 
top of that, I also contribute that the business environment (and or legal framework) matters in 
developing countries if they are to experience higher productivity. This paper emphasizes that 
mobile phones add to broader financial inclusion, better agricultural outcomes, and improved 
women empowerment. Perhaps the underlying reason why we see improvements in all these areas 
is the network effects associated with mobile phone penetration or usage.  
Implications 
My results imply that policy-makers in developing countries must make it easy for 
entrepreneurs and other adopters of mobile phones to conduct economically productive activities. 
This could be done through minimizing or opportunities to by-pass some of the requirements 
needed before one can legally start operating their entrepreneurial venture. Registrations fees must 
be as small as possible. All these and other measures may lead to improvements in the ease of 
doing business in a country. Given that there is also a chance that mobile phone technology 
developments add to physical capital accumulation, which is also necessary for productivity and 
growth, precaution must be taken. Adopters should take precaution by ensuring that they 
understand the nature of information and communication technologies infrastructure or hardware 
equipment, which depreciates quickly.  Planners and policy-makers should ensure that structures 
are in place to guarantee overall long-lasting and high value add physical capital accumulation 
takes place. On top of that, at the macro-level, investments towards mobile phone proliferation 
must be done in a way that does not take away developments in others key sectors such as 
education, which also boost productivity. At the micro-level, expenditures on mobile phone 
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adoption and services must be moderate such that they do not take away from money spent of food 
and other essential services, especially for the poor. Realizing the productive potential mobile 
phone technology has on the poor, policy makers could structure poverty alleviation programs 
centered around usage of these services. For instance, poor subsistence farmers could be provided 
with mobile technologies and services at subsidized rates such that they raise their productivity, 
output, and ultimately incomes. This will enable them to beat the poverty trap.  
Opportunities for Future Research 
One of the opportunities for future research involves reverse causality. Here, the dilemma 
is as follows: does mobile phone adoption lead to higher output per capita or higher output per 
capita leads to higher mobile adoption?  To account for reverse causality, the dependent variable 
in this study could be expressed as a function of capital, labor, and telecommunications 
infrastructure, consistent with Gruber and Pantelis (2011). Another opportunity is to perform by-
country or by-region analysis such that one can compare and evaluate the impact of mobile phone 
proliferation in Africa, Latin America and Carribean separately.  
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Appendix 
 
Table 1: Multicollinearity test results 
 
Variable  VIF 1/VIF 
Broadband 2.34 0.426988 
G 2.24 0.447209 
I 2.15 0.465841 
Penrate 1.90 0.526844 
Edu 1.65 0.607436 
DTSB 1.23 0.810699 
Open 1.20 0.832330 
FDI 1.19 0.842525 
Mean VIF = 1.8  
 
Table 2: Summary Statistics 
Variable  Obs Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
  
Y 1,210 11.259
8 
2.43961 4.89406 17.4525
2 
Penrate 1,236 .57189
45 
1.23150
4 
0 18.7908
1 
Broadban
d 
889 2.1365
2 
3.84568
6 
0 21.2101
3 
G 1,210 4.7287
23 
20.9247 0 286.991
5 
I 1,097 2.33e-
14 
2.85e-
13 
0 7.69e-12 
FDI 1,206 1.8028
91 
8.91070
7 
-
12.56733 
131.941
4 
Edu 624 16.389
25 
18.3870
6 
.33312 119.778
7 
Open 607 1993.6
88 
12122.9
1 
0 118512 
DTSB 923 50.534
78 
73.6071
2 
3 697.5 
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Table 3: Results on assessing the impact of mobile phone proliferation on gdp per capita in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
Latin America and Caribbean (excluding high-income countries). 
 
   Linear Model  Quadratic   Model   
Dep Var Y         
Penrate   1.16***  
(.26)    
2.6***  
(.72)   
Penrate2    -1.1**  
(.5)   
Broadband    -.03  
(.04)  
-.01 
(.09)  
Broadband2  .0003 
(.007) 
G   -.4***   
(.03) 
-.39***  
(.02)   
I  
 
0 (omitted) 0 (omitted) 
FDI   .004 
(.02)   
.001 
(.02)   
Edu  .01***  
(0.004)   
.01*** 
(.004)  
Open  .47 
(.01)   
.4 
(.00001) 
DTSB  -.27*** 
 (7993.569)   
-.25***  
(.09)   
Cons   12.4*** 
(.36)   
12***  
(.4)   
N   325 325 
R2 56%  57%  
     
 
Standard errors are in parentheses 
*** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
